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Introduction
Modern (and postmodern) time is defined by the notion of the creative subjectum which, 
nevertheless, has its roots in antiquity. Its subjectivity, which manifests in a creative-techno-
logical manner, differs from the Heideggerian Dasein in that the latter, as a site for Being’s 
revelation, can be described as an ecstatically passive activity whereas the former has nothing 
to do with this passivity and is in this sense self-sufficient and absolutely active. Manifesting 
this activity is what postmodern creativity consists in.
The notion of creativity may derive from the ancient Roman “creatio” which later, in 
Christianity, acquired the meaning of creation ex nihilo and, then, at the dawn of modernity, 
turned into the poetic creation de novo. In the 19th century it was considered merely a con-
cept of aesthetics, while in the 20th century the concept expanded to include scientists and 
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engineers and, eventually, all artistic and scientific (or scholarly) activity, which can now be 
organized and stimulated by providing a suitable social environment (cf. Kačerauskas, 2014, 
p. 8). In medieval times creation was divine but in modern and postmodern times we can 
notice, instead, a divinization of society and individuals whose happiness can be easily at-
tained by technological and communicational means.
Some authors (cf. Kačerauskas, 2014, p. 8) make a distinction between the meanings 
of the Latin “creatio” and “facere” because they deem the latter an equivalent of the Greek 
“poiēsis”. Facere/poiēsis is, thus, considered to denote a notion of defined boundaries, while 
creatio denotes the possibility of novelty. In this paper, we shall try to befriend these two 
notions by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s work on Western ontology. His work is relevant 
because in it both the notion of the creation from nothing and the Greek notion of poiēsis 
have merged. Thus we shall be able to discover a “common denominator” for creatio and 
poiēsis and to see the history of Western ontology from its beginning in ancient Greece till 
today as a unified manifestation of a single principle. This shall allow us to construe creativ-
ity as an ontological issue and to capture the basic meaning which unifies different fields of 
its manifestation.
The creative society also faces a couple of practical issues. First of them is the growing 
need for interdisciplinary communication and cooperation for the sake of the development 
of creative solutions but it is hindered by the traditional definite boundaries of sciences. We 
can recognize in this conflict the image of the aforementioned dualism between facere (as 
indicating closed boundaries) and creatio (as indicating open novelties). Another issue has to 
do with the legal protection of creation and creators as a social group which might be seen 
to hinder communication. They are provided with the copyright and the patent law but these 
rights, in turn, originate conflicts in society which hinder the development of the economy 
based on creativity. As the boundary between discovery and invention fades, creative workers 
invade different fields of life and try to “privatize” social (including, natural) property based 
on their patent law. The conflict arises precisely in the attempt to distribute and redistribute 
this social property because the winners are plainly those who are the first to reach the pat-
ent office (Kačerauskas, 2012, p. 75). Furthermore, patenting new ideas can become a serious 
bureaucratic hindrance to creativity. However, these practical issues shall concern us only 
inasmuch as they manifest an ontology as opposed to attempting practical solutions.
In this paper we shall not delve into practical issues but only use them as an occasion to 
delve into deeper metaphysical or ontological level upon which the practical problematic of 
technology and communication in fact rests. We shall take up the approach which is more 
important than practical solutions; we shall be after a change of aspect (Ludwig Wittgen-
stein) that shall allow us to take up a more original stance in the face of both practical and 
theoretical challenges.1
1 Lately, some articles have discussed communication theory from a Heideggerian or philosophical perspective: 
Youngjoon Choi and John Dattilo (2017), Edvardas Rimkus (2018), Jessica N. Sturgess (2016), Shirley Ou Yang 
(2016) and Ștefan Vlăduțescu (2014).
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1. From practical issues to ontological solutions
The legal principles of copyright and patent law, which define communication in the econom-
ic-technological field, have metaphysical roots. They are the offspring and an expression of 
the metaphysics of genius wherein our notion of creativity is embedded. Genius is an indi-
vidual who can create from nothing (ex nihilo). That means he is ascribed the power which, 
previously, had been available to (Christian) God and only to Him. One could even link the 
birth of genius to the death of God whereupon genius inherited the power to create ex nihilo. 
Now that artistic (and, eventually, any) creation was self-made, the creator was destined to 
claim the ownership of his creation. Consequently, he was entitled to copyright and patent 
law, that is he was acknowledged the exclusive right to manipulate the fruit of his creative 
endeavor for the sake of his own gain, sustenance and growth.
The individualism in the notion or consciousness of genius sprang also (alongside the 
notion of creation from nothing), obviously, from Christian metaphysics. The notion of the 
creation of the world and the soul from nothing brought about the consciousness of the soul’s 
constant hanging above the abyss of nothingness where into one could at any time be brought 
back if it was not for the sustaining power of God (Athanasius of Alexandria). A Christian, 
as long as his nature remained sinful and ever in need of God’s mercy, was at any moment in 
danger of eternal death. Hence the gratitude to God as his savior. Also, the direct experience 
of nothingness had the most individualizing effect. Ancient notions of eternal recurrence of 
the same provided a basic sense of unity (or publicity) of all things with eternity, or the one, 
the eternal living principle, while the Christian experience of the ex nihilo called for monastic 
meditation and discipline. Will had to be discovered and employed for the sake of saving 
one’s metaphysically mortal soul, and the discovery of will opened the possibility of novelty.
We cannot overemphasize the importance of the introduction of the new linear time 
(Augustine of Hippo) as opposed to circularities of the ancient world. Modernity was shaped 
largely by the victory of will’s creativity against the regularities of the intellect as well as by the 
victory of linear time against circular (hence, eternal) time. Our assertion could be opposed 
by noting the crucial importance of mathematical rationality for modernity. But, to reply, 
mathematical science soon revealed its technological nature, that is, its subjection to will’s 
creativity (also see Stasiulis, 2016a). The eternity of the world, or the eternal forms, or the 
God-written mathematical laws, were expropriated by the human mind and put to service 
of the human kind. Analogically, the modern rational political order was expropriated by 
individualized national states for their own sakes. Also, rationalization of life was expropri-
ated for the sake of individual human rights (especially, the right to life and the pursuit of 
happiness). Making of the world and of things was expropriated by genius. Later, the notion 
of genius spread out from being ascribed to single individuals of exceptional excellence to 
being the essential property of any creative endeavor and to belonging to many, if not any, 
individuals or the systems in which they are contained (cf. Černevičiūtė & Strazdas, 2014). 
If every Christian had an (im)mortal soul, every postmodern has creativity. The exercise of 
creativity can be seen as an analog of and a substitute for Grace.
However, every solution entails its own problems. First of all, if creativity is conceived as 
an essentially immanent force, how about the basic human need for transcendence (noted 
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by Immanuel Kant, Wittgenstein and Emmanuel Levinas, among many others)? If creativ-
ity is employed in the pursuit of happiness, can happiness be achieved autonomously, apart 
from transcendence? Secondly, if creativity is enjoyed by individuals, can it not be hindered 
by overly agonistic relations among individuals who do not share any kind of unity? How to 
overcome the tendency towards solipsism to make communication and cooperation possible? 
Does creativity take place in a common world? Can de-divinized world be enjoyed, even if 
we approach it ecologically (Parastoo Saeidi et al., 2018; Stasiulis, 2018a, 2018b)? Where shall 
we look for ontology that can sustain the new economic order of the creative society over 
and above the competition of copyright and patent owners? Thirdly and most importantly, 
how should the openness of creativity deal with the opposing tendencies towards stability 
and rigid determination?
In our view, these issues can be addressed in terms of Heideggerian musings on the 
(modern) subject and the Dasein. Firstly, Dasein’s reciprocal relation with Being avoids the 
closure of immanence by dint of the clearing (Lichtung). Secondly, Dasein as being-with and 
as being in the fourfold avoids the overly agonistic and exploitative stance (and is, obviously, 
essentially communicative). Thirdly, Dasein is a novel construal of the fundamental Western 
notion of ousia and, accordingly, a transformation of ratio and logos (“language, discourse”) 
in terms of the clearing wherein the opposition between the creative and the rigid dissolves. 
In brief, Dasein is a fundamental re-orientation of the subject which is but another name, or 
the ontological source, of the modern genius. Hence, the following musings shall be devoted 
to describing the relation of subject to Dasein.
2. Creativity and presence
Heidegger derives Greek thought – and, consequently, all Western thought – from the pri-
mary experience of presence. While presence (ousia) has been interpreted as “concept” or as 
“eternity”, or as a “whole”, Heidegger identifies it with a pre-conceptual source of isness and 
of creativity and he construes it as Being in essential relation to temporality. We must see it 
as a crucial re-reading of Greek thought – as opposed to plainly rejecting it – in a way that 
dissolves the fruitless opposition between strictly determined conceptual thought and inter-
pretative interdisciplinary thought and reveals the condition of the possibility of communi-
cation and even cooperation among different conceptual spheres. We claim that Heidegger’s 
reading let us understand better how different themes of thought in ancient thinking, based 
on the intuition of communicative unity of the common world, (first of all, Plato’s and Aris-
totle’s) could be subdued to clear definitions yet be utterly contextual and merging into one 
another. We could use it as a model for our own endeavor to think. For that purpose, we must 
learn more about the “other” thinking of Being (as of a pre-theoretical source of all theory).
To capture this pre-conceptual, or pre-theoretical, level of thought, Heidegger, in Being and 
Time (2006, in German: Sein und Zeit, originally published in 1927), introduces the “existen-
tials” (Existenzialien) which are opposed to “categories”. “Categorial” thinking – the source of 
both successes and failures of our communication – is our post-Aristotelian mode of revealing 
Being while “existential” thinking is recovered by novel phenomenological and hermeneu-
tic re-reading of Aristotelian philosophy in its Greek context. The precursor to “existentials” 
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(as a “window” to novel communication) in early Heidegger was “formal indication” (formale 
Anzeige) which was to touch the precognitive level and to approach “something” which bor-
ders on ineffability. The reason why Heidegger (2006, p. 3) emphasizes that Being is not the 
most general and the most empty of concepts is that it is not conceptual at all, i.e., just like 
in Husserlian formal indication, it cannot be grasped by the structure of genera and species.
In fact, Heidegger finds a pre-cursor to formally-indicative and existential thinking/
speaking in Aristotle – to wit, in his understanding of the analogy of Being. Ana-logia in 
Aristotle is “something” into which all namings or “katēgoriai” are said back or carried back 
to (ana-legontai or ana-ferontai). Heidegger points out that thus they all address or are linked 
to “one” Being which cannot be captured conceptually (1990, p. 43, 47). Also, importantly, 
Heidegger makes the distinction between “one” as “single” and “one” as “simple”: simple is 
one but also manifold (2005, p. 153). Being is one as simple and is, hence, expressed mani-
foldwise. This meaning of “oneness” as “simplicity” is also Aristotelian (cf. Aristotle, 1984, 
187a 1-3) and, according to Heidegger, this Aristotelian emphasis on manifoldness is by no 
means a rejection of Parmenidean thought but precisely an expression of it (1990, p. 27).
Here we have moved in the direction of the “structure” of ontological difference but, to 
note, in Heidegger the (re-)reading of Greek thought is always mediated by the Christian ex-
perience of transcendence. Thus, Theodore Kisiel also (1993, p. 20) traces the root of formal 
indication to the Scholastic version of the doctrine of analogy, first provided by Duns Scotus. 
On the other hand, it is a phenomenological reading based also on Heidegger’s neo-Kantian 
predecessors. Heideggerian formal indication was born from the meeting of a medieval tran-
scendental of unum and the “reflexive category” of the neo-Kantian Emil Lask (Kisiel, 1993, 
p. 26). “Constitutive” categories, for Lask, articulated reality while the “reflexive category” ad-
dressed “something” prior to logical dressing and objectification. This meant it was much like 
medieval transcendentals (ens, unum, verum, bonum) which played precisely the unifying 
role. When our ponderings moved towards the most general and the most unified, we were 
in the “area” of the “reflexive category”. It indicated an unreflecting acceptance of the given.
To avoid making this givenness banal and “most empty” and “most general”, we should 
note that this es gibt is meant to capture the very first movements of thought and its arising 
from the amorphous (perhaps, apophatic) homogenous experience of the thing-in-itself. In 
the Middle Ages, this primary Undifferentiated “something” was the ens commune. If we do 
not fail to think this Undifferentiated correctly, we realize that any generality here loses all 
sense as the Undifferentiated is obviously beyond the field structured by genera and species.
While this Undifferentiated is, in neo-Kantian terms, a homogeneous continuum, think-
ing arises at the border between the ineffable and the effable, between the Undifferentiated 
and differentiation. At this point of differentiation – in fact, reminiscent of Plato’s (1993) 
ponderings in the Sophist – the couple of identity and difference, of “the one” and “the other” 
emerges; something can exist only by being different from another, by being not-other. The 
important thing, indicated formally, for Heidegger is that the alleged tautology of es gibt, 
ens est is in fact a heterology. Hence, Being manifests to thought as relation and as related 
where all “members” of the articulated sphere arise equiprimordially (gleichursprünglich). It 
is precisely in the context of describing the line between the undifferentiated and the dif-
ferentiated that Heidegger first used the latter key term of equiprimordiality (Kisiel, 1993, p. 
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37) which he later used to describe the mit-Sein and mit-Dasein of beings in the articulated 
(manifested, unconcealed) sphere of Dasein.
This “idea” of equiprimordiality of oneness and manifoldness and of identity and differ-
ence stretched from the early to the late period of Heidegger’s philosophy. In the late work on 
the principle of identity (Heidegeris, 1992) the thinker claimed that the word(s) “the same” 
(der Selbe, to auto), just like the esti (es gibt) of Parmenides, presuppose a difference inside 
sameness. Whereas even for young Heidegger, pure monism without contraries could not 
even be thought, and therefore things (beings) existed, essentially, in Bewandtnis, in a nexus 
(cf. Kisiel, 1993, p. 37).
And the nexus-character of beings (which is precisely what enables communicating) as 
manifestation of the Undifferentiated is what the famous temporality of Being consists in. 
Heidegger claimed to have found this “insight” of Being’s temporality in the Greek thinking 
of ousia. While in the course of history the temporal dimension had been overshadowed by 
the stability aspect of ousia, Heideggerian primordial interpretation sought to retrieve this 
crucial insight.
According to Heidegger, ousia, for the Greeks, meant constant presence (ständige Anwe-
sung). While the stability, or constanty, aspect would consequently inform the basis of our 
conceptual and scientific endeavor, Heidegger, already in his early period, moved toward re-
trieving its temporal dimensions by noting that the transcentendal unum is related to intention-
ality and movedness (Bewegtheit). As Heidegger kept distancing himself from the conceptual 
worldless phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and the still object-oriented reflexivity of Lask, 
he came to consider intentionality as derived from the primordial stream of life which was 
self-sufficient or self-sustaining (here also note an influence of Meister Eckhart). Formally in-
dicated phenomena were maximally general, indifferent and contentless so as to let appear the 
spontaneous understanding characteristics of lifestream itself. At this point phenomenology 
and hermeneutics coincided to give birth to peculiarly Heideggerian pondering. The step from 
objectifying phenomenology to “pre-phenomenological” hermeneutics of the stream of life 
and from the stilling conceptual grasp to formal indication which succeeded in not inhibiting 
this stream both presupposed the Heideggerian reading of Aristotle and was presupposed by 
it. This reading consists in 1) the destruction of our ontology derived from Greek thought and 
2) a retrieval of the original meaning of the Greek Dasein from Aristotle’s – and, consequently, 
prior Greek – thought. Thus, the desubstantialization of Dasein (“subject”) in Being and Time 
went hand in hand with a revelation of the primordial temporal and communicative structure 
of Dasein, or ousia, based on a fresh taking-up of Aristotelian notions such as, most impor-
tantly, that of the structure of the kinēsis of fysis, energeia and the relation of poiēsis and pathēsis 
in movement. The relation of poiēsis and pathēsis in fact defines the “structure” of ontological 
difference (which is but another name for Being’s temporal revelation).
3. The creative and the definite
Heideggerian notion of the ontological difference, of the difference between beings and Be-
ing, was made possible by the Christian notion of creation from nothing and of the radical 
difference between transcendent God and the created world. Here, of course, the crucial 
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aspect is phenomenological – the experience of nihil as it was already explicated by Thomas 
Aquinas (see Aleksandravičius, 2009, p. 209). As we in part noted before, it is also the experi-
ence of gratitude, jubilation and worship. To put it differently, it is the experience of activity 
rooted in passivity. This is precisely what characterizes the Dasein and differentiates it from 
the subject as the basis for solipsism which hinders communication and cooperation.
Heed that we, in our Aristotelian-Heideggerian ponderings, do not have to be enclosed 
within the narrow confines of what the modern subject terms “rational” and, by re-reading 
the Greeks with the presupposition of ontological difference, we can attain a richer meaning 
of logos as of that which “gathers” (sammelt).
Aristotle – so important to Heidegger – himself was not as standardized a logician as its 
present-day decendants. While it was only in the 20th century that we started to realize that 
everyday live speech is not “logical” and has its own (unarticulated) rules, this knowledge 
was already present in Aristotle’s texts. It existed precisely in the afore-mentioned notion of 
analogia. While logic operates with genera and species, Being itself cannot be caught in logic 
because Being’s prior intentionality is the condition of the very possibility of logic.
Traditionally, the essence, or ousia, of a thing is caught in a (“logical”) definition (oris-
mos). As Heidegger now deals with pre-conceptual sources of “concepts”, he is able to show 
the origin of ousiology itself from the Greek Dasein’s revelation of the wordliness of the 
world. Aristotle is claimed by Heidegger to have taken up meanings from the everyday Greek 
language and brought them into his concepts (orismos, katēgoria, etc.) As if he remembered, 
or unconcealed, (brought to concept) what was there for every Greek in his or her casual 
communication to conceive or experience. Thus, Heideggerian discussion of ousia does not 
merely deal with the way this word is used in Plato’s or Aristotle’s texts; and Heidegger is not 
satisfied with mere statement that, for Aristotle, ousia is the first of categories.
In the Heideggerian phenomenologico-hermeneutic recovery, ousia reveals the field of 
Dasein itself and is shown to have two basic possibilities of meaning. First, the field can be 
appropriated by the gaze of the subject. Second, the field can be characterized by the recipro-
cal dependence of Being and Dasein. This interdependence is characterized by the activity of 
Dasein rooted in passivity, whereas in the first instance Dasein has turned into “mere” subject 
which is therefore absolutely active, devoid of any passivity.
The two possibilities were already there in the primordial intending (revealing) of ousia as 
the word itself, like its Heideggerian German “counterpart” Anwesen, means “property, hav-
ing, stock” and the like. Now, upokeimenon, or – in Latin – subject(um), is the (phenomenal) 
field “had” by Dasein, the very origin of this field and, therefore, its very basis which is the 
gist of its very isness. For this reason, the field of isness can be conceived as dependent upon 
subject as upon Dasein absolved from Being and having thus turned into the basis for all is-
ness (for all beings). The possibility of Dasein’s turning into “mere” subject – the possibility 
of concealing Being and also losing the possibility of authentic communication – was granted 
by the omission of distinguishing between these two meanings. Only by understanding the 
transcendental subject as Dasein are we able, again, to unconceal Being and to enter authentic 
communicative relationships based on the authentic understanding of discourse.
To succeed where the Greeks allegedly failed, Heidegger draws also on the stock of me-
dieval Christian philosophy – on the notion of God’s intentionality with which the human 
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soul shares an intimate connection (cf. Kisiel, 1993, p. 31; Mojsisch & Summerell, 2011). For 
the medieval feeling, the pure “transcendental” givenness of things is not the most basic as 
there is still one deeper level to go to – that of God. By meeting the transcendence of God, 
Man is able grasp the dependence of his mind and its contents (the world) on God. By us-
ing this medieval notion of soul’s primordial relation to God, Heidegger will get the modern 
“subject” to remember (to unconceal) its dependence on and interdependence with Being 
and the field of isness will reveal itself as a gift of Being to be treasured.
We can assert quite safely that both Being and Time and even the whole of Heidegger’s 
thought revolves about this twofold possibility of revealing (concealing or un-concealing) 
ousia: hence, the destruction of upokeimenon and the Greek ontology, upon which the mod-
ern (“Cartesian”) subject rests, goes hand in hand with a novel retrieval of ousia, or Being 
as un-concealed, empowered by Christian experience of transcendence and the ex nihilo. 
Also, importantly, just like the Christian notion of creation ex nihilo conceives human mind, 
which includes all creation, to be in constant relation to actus essendi (the act that gives it 
origin) – and thus the mind “follows” each ontologically created and sustained being in time 
and gives it unity (Aleksandravičius, 2009, p. 219), so Heideggerian thinking of Being and 
of beings as unconcealed in Dasein also avoids the infamous dualism of object and subject. 
Accordingly, the ontologically basic division of the world into separated subjects or atoms is 
also gone to yield room to communicative Dasein.
4. Creativity as receptivity in ecstatic time
We must also discuss another related meaning of passivity or receptivity which Heidegger 
retrieves from Aristotelian notion of pathos.2
In Being and Time Dasein as Being-in-the-world is described as ever already touched 
(angegangen) by innerwordly beings but only because Dasein is ever already intentional, ever 
intends – or reveals – the world (Heidegger, 2006, p. 137). This notion of Being-in-the-world 
refers back to the Aristotelian notion of the soul, or the mind of the soul (tēs psuchēs nous) 
(Heidegger, 1993, p. 326). Intentionality as revealing of the world or being involved in the 
world is characteristic, for Aristotle, of the nous and is described in terms of creation/work/
making: the ergon of the nous is dis-covery of the world. This ergon has two aspects. On the 
one hand, mind’s being thrown into the world, his aprioric being in the world is its aspect 
of passivity: the being touched by the world and the innerwordly is the pathic aspect of the 
nous (Heidegger, 1993, p. 326). On the other hand, this meeting of things, this intentionality 
is the transcendental activity of the nous, or Dasein, its ergon: nous pathetikos is only possible 
because of nous poiētikos, which uncovers the world (Heidegger, 1993, p. 326). This passively-
active discovery of the world is Dasein or the field of presence, or energeia. Heidegger stresses 
that the unity of poēsis and pathēsis is essential for Greek thought and their understanding 
of life. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotelian pathos is the predecessor of the existentials of 
Stimmung (“mood”) and Befindlichkeit (“state-of-mind”). Pathos is not “emotion” but the 
condition of the possibility of any emotion or feeling, or, indeed, of any revelation of the 
2 For Heidegger, discourse, or communication, is inextricably united with pathos as it is well manisfested in Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric (2015).
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world and of any discourse. Therefore, Heidegger, in Being and Time, describes Dasein as ever 
already having a mood (always being “bestimmt”) and thus Befindlichkeit is a fundamental 
existential (2006, p. 134). Indeed, the primary uncovering of the world belong to “mere” feel-
ing (construed ontologically as opposed to ontically) (Heidegger, 2006, p. 138).
The Aristotelian unity of pathēsis and poiēsis is, in Being and Time, conveyed in terms of 
throwness (Geworfenheit) as the passive aspect and understanding (Verstehen) as the active 
aspect: every understanding has its mood, every mood understands (Heidegger, 2006, p. 335).
Heidegger’s notion of Being’s temporality is based on the Greek understanding of Being in 
terms of kinēsis. While kinēsis is defined precisely by the unity of poēsis and pathēsis; for this 
reason, Plato is able to conceive of all Being as “poetic” (see Steadman, 2014; Stasiulis, 2016b).
Hence, Heideggerian thought depends on the individualizing (Christian) experience of 
the creation out of nothing, based on which he is able to reinterpret the inherited concepts of 
Aristotle and to read the notion of ontological difference out of the Greek Dasein. He thus 
is able to avoid both the dualism of subject and object and the opposition between Greek 
“cyclical” thought (traditionally conceived as) oriented toward unity and the “individualistic” 
Christian linear time based on the creation of novelty out of nothing. Thus, he is able to help 
Greek and Christian revelations of godliness befriend and to root creativity in the newly dis-
covered notion of piety as the condition of authentic communication.
We can see this reconciliation of ancient “circular” and “definite” thought with thought 
based on “novelty” in Heidegger’s phenomenological reading of Aristotle notion of “eternity”. 
The dualism of “definiteness” versus “novelty” is substituted with a phenomenological opposi-
tion between “authentic” and “inauthentic” – or, we could say, pious and impious – thought. 
The aei, aidion, according to Heidegger, first of all denotes the “now”, the “presence” which is 
the gist of Greek thought. In the concept of aidion, aidion is opposed to ginomenon apeirakis. 
Heidegger stresses that it does not mean a difference between “eternity” and “temporality”, 
“time” (1976, p. 268). In the latter non-Greek differentiation, “eternity” denotes a duration 
with has no limit, no beginning and end, while “time” denotes something limited. But for 
Greeks it is all the contrary: the limitless is precisely what is opposite to aidion. Heidegger 
explains that for the Greeks this limitless means something that sometimes is, sometimes is 
not. Thus, for the Greeks the limit – peras – does not denote either an external delimitation 
or a coming to a stop but rather it means something that defines in the sense of providing 
a basis (Halt) and a stand (Bestand) (Heidegger, 1976, p. 269), the reason why something 
begins and is present. While what is limitless is verfallen, it has fallen to the inauthentic (un-
ecstatic) way of being (and to mere “ideal discourse”). In this sense of the forgetfulness of 
Being Heidegger (1980) defines our current way of being as limitless and, hence, subject to 
hubris (the pride of genius) (cf. the endnote to The Origin of the Work of Art (in German: 
Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, originally published in 1950).
Conclusions
Heideggerian thinking provides an original way of approaching the metaphysics or the on-
tology upon which our everyday and our key practical notions of communication rest. The 
oppositions between the whole and the individual, between the definite and the creative seem 
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to lose meaning as Heidegger undermines both the modern notion of genius and, what is 
more, all Western metaphysics. Even more importantly, his thinking outlines an original no-
tion of creativity which takes up and transforms the notion of novel creation from nothing 
by eventually substituting it with the notion of ecstatic creation as unconcealment. Herein 
we can have a clue of a new notion of piety which is yet completely formal and general but 
which is to inform future creativity and to become the root of communication.
I think there is also another key meaning to Heidegger’s work. As it has been contributing 
to destroying our current conceptual and scientific and political thought and, simultaneously, 
has been uncovering ways to read the context of Greek and, hence, our own thought in new 
ontological light, it has given us the opportunity to reread ancient texts – especially those key 
texts of Plato’s and Aristotle’s – without our customary pre-conceptions about their sense. I 
suggest that we would not fail to acquire new insights into our condition if we attempted to 
read works of Plato and Aristotle not as exercises in conceptual thought but as exercises in 
unconcealment. For instance, Plato’s (2000) Republic (in Greek: Politeia, originally published 
in 380 BC) read thus, could appear to be an entertaining utopia of the creative city and to 
provide an exemplary model of communication. This is the task to be taken up in the future.
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KOMUNIKACINIS KŪRYBIŠKUMAS: NUO ĮPRASTINĖS 
METAFIZIKOS PRIE ORIGINALIOS ONTOLOGIJOS
Nerijus Stasiulis
Santrauka
Straipsnyje tiriamas kūrybos komunikacijos visuomenėje ir kūrybinio miesto meta-
fizinis pamatas, taip pat siekiama atrasti praktinių problemų, su kuriomis šiandien 
susiduriame kasdienybėje ir ekonomikoje, metafizinius pagrindus. Susitelkiama 
į genijaus metafiziką ir ankstesnę krikščioniškąją kūrimo iš nieko metafiziką, taip 
pat ir į individualios valios svarbą kaip genialumo sampratos pirmtakus. Vakarų ra-
cionalizmas, kurio viena iš apraiškų yra apibrėžtos mokslų ribos ir iracionalizmas, 
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o jo apraiška yra genijaus metafizika, vis dar nustato mūsų šiandienės minties bei 
polemikos rėmus autorių ir patentų teisių, mokslų ir menų komunikacijos (t. y. ben-
dradarbiavimo) klausimais. Ištyrus praktinės problematikos metafizinį kontekstą, 
pateikiama haidegeriškoji Vakarų metafizikos pertvarka, siekiant suformuoti origi-
nalią ontologiją, kurios tikslas – formuoti praktiką ateityje. Parodoma, kad pati eks-
tatinio laiko samprata yra itin reikšminga originaliam kūrybiškumui.
Reikšminiai žodžiai: autorių teisės, kūrybiškumas, genijus, Heideggeris, darpdaly-
kinė komunikacija, ontologija, patentų teisė.
